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Chapter XXX
Which Rights for Which Subjects?
Genetic Confidentiality and Privacy in the 
Post-Genomic Era
Antoinette Rouvroy
European University Institute, Italy
Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
ABSTRACT
The aim of the present chapter is to elucidate the paradoxical position of the individual legal subject in 
the context of human genetics. It first discusses the assumed individual “right to know” and “right not 
to know” about genetic susceptibilities, predispositions and risks when genetic tests exist, and assess 
the usual assumption according to which more information necessarily increases liberty and enhances 
autonomy. A second section is dedicated to the issues of confidentiality, intra-familial disclosure and 
familial management of genetic information. The idea is suggested that those issues challenge the fun-
damental liberal unit of the individual traditionally understood as a stable, unitary, embodied entity.
INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding the fears and expectations 
unleashed by the hype surrounding the “genetic 
revolution” initiated in the early nineties with the 
Human Genome Project, the so-called “new hu-
man genetics” has not transformed nor provided 
definitive elucidation of what it is to be human 
but has undoubtedly shifted the locus of inquiry 
for characterising commonalities and variations 
among the human species. Focusing on “genes”, 
the scrutiny has shifted from ‘visible’ superficial 
physiognomy and anatomy, from the layer of 
physical appearance and expressed behaviours, 
and from ‘incalculable’ social, economical and 
environmental contexts, to the ‘invisible’ but 
locatable and ‘calculable’ internal, molecular 
milieu. 
What may the rights and duties of the individual 
subject be with regard to “his” newly accessible 
genetic information? Does the individual have a 
“right to know”, a “right not to know”, a “duty 
to know” or “liberty to know” about medically 
or otherwise meaningful features of his own 
genome? Given the shared nature of genetic in-
formation, how are those rights or liberties of the 
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subject to be weighed against competing claims 
by blood relatives interested in the same genetic 
information? Genetic information is the “locus” 
of intersection of a network of concurring and 
conflicting interests, and obfuscates the lawyers’ 
predispositions to think in terms of dual relations 
of individual rights and correlative individual or 
collective duties. 
A second section will be dedicated to the intra-
familial conflicts of interests in genetic informa-
tion, and to the ensuing challenges this imposes to 
medico-legal norms such as the health provider’s 
duty of confidentiality. What are the possibilities 
and implications of acknowledging the existence 
of a collective ‘genetic subject’ transcending 
individual embodiment? The subject of genetic 
information and of genetic privacy (the patient 
entitled to care and confidentiality in the patient-
doctor relationship) is not even easily identifiable 
in the genetic context. Enabling the prediction 
of disease or the assessment of disease-risk with 
varying degrees of certainty, genetic information 
is of course important to the tested person,1 but 
may also be crucial to persons who share the same 
genetic inheritance and are virtually exposed to 
the same genetic risks. Those persons (blood rela-
tives) may sometimes be recognized a legitimate 
and legally protected interest, however not usually 
raised up to the status of a right to force intra-fa-
milial disclosure, but requiring some procedural 
measures enhancing the patient’s aptitudes to 
reflect upon the interests of those third parties 
and to act “morally” towards them. The moral or 
legal character of the obligations owned by the 
individual directly concerned regarding disclo-
sure of genetic information to family members 
is a controversial issue. Indeed, isn’t the subject 
of genetic information the whole ‘genetic group’ 
or genetically-related family? The dual doctor-
patient relationship seems prone to explode into a 
complexified network of relationships extending 
to the whole “genetic family”. The duties owed by 
one person vis a vis his relatives when aware of 
the presence of specific familial genetic ailments 
(Rhodes, 1998), or when asked to cooperate in a 
familial inquiry in order to establish the results 
of a genetic test required by one of the members 
of his family are to be assessed as well as the 
consequences of this potential collectivization of 
genetic rights for our representation of the liberal 
individual. Indeed, the extension of the medical 
doctor’s duties towards members of the genetic 
group and the related issue of intra-familial dis-
closure of genetic information further challenge 
the exclusive control traditionally granted to the 
liberal individual over “his” personal information 
and biological material, and contradicts current 
discourses about individual self-ownership and 
empowerment.
THE “RIGHT TO KNOW” AND THE 
“RIGHT NOT TO KNOW”
A usual argument favouring the “duty to know” 
over the “right not to know” is that genetic risk 
information positively reinforce the ‘genetically 
informed’ and ‘genetically empowered’ individu-
al’s autonomy. The argument appears particularly 
compelling as a major ethical and legal imperative 
of neoliberal societies is the respect and, where 
necessary, enhancement of individual autonomy. 
Being aware of one’s genetic risks, it is assumed, 
allows individuals to better adapt their lifestyle 
and diet, adopting a preventative attitude in order 
to keep healthy.2 Yet, the relationship between 
genetic information and individual autonomy is 
much more complex than usually assumed. 
What predictive genetic testing allows is the 
designation of patients in an anticipatory sense. 
Although in classical medical practice, the quasi 
contractual patient-doctor relationship arose 
because of observable symptoms, a genetic test 
may be offered to currently asymptomatic, healthy 
individuals. In the legal sphere, that shift is also 
resented as a disruption: what rights and obliga-
tions should the ‘asymptomatic ills’ be allocated 
by virtue of their status’ as ‘genetically at risk’? 
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Genetic testing is closer to the notion of prognostic 
than to the notion of diagnostic. Most of the time 
genetic testing doesn’t reveal a currently existing 
health problem in a symptomatic individual but 
rather reveals, for asymptomatic, healthy persons, 
a mere probability or a particular susceptibility 
to develop some illnesses for which preventive 
or curative strategy are most often not, or not yet 
available. Notwithstanding the uncertainty char-
acterising the genetic predictions,3 what is new 
is the presentation of a clear genetic causal line 
(even if genetic make-up is merely exceptionally 
the exclusive and sufficient cause) going from an 
identified locus in the genome to the phenotypic 
manifestation of the disease. ‘The chanciness and 
luck that accompany present-day risk assessment 
will be replaced by the clear mark of genetic sus-
ceptibility in one’s very identity’, Johnsen noted 
(Jonsen, 1996: 10). A new dimension that genetic 
information introduces in the individual takes the 
form of his inescapably anticipated ‘future self’ 
which the genetically informed individual can no 
longer ignore. The relationship existing between 
‘genetic self-knowledge’ and autonomy or liberty 
deserves new assessment in light of that new 
‘genetic condition’ of self-experiencing. 
A seemingly universal intuition is that:
the better informed the individual is, the more 
capable he is of making decisions in line with 
his own basic wishes, since he is more likely to 
succeed in realizing his wishes if the beliefs he 
acts from are well-founded. This makes autonomy 
a matter of degree: generally, the more informa-
tion relevant to a decision one has when making 
it, the more autonomous it is. From this point of 
view it seems difficult to defend a general right 
to ignorance. (Radetzki, 2003: 110) 
Information about risks to oneself is usually 
considered enhancing individual liberty by allow-
ing for better informed, and thus more rational, 
actions and choices. The perceived liberating 
virtues of information emancipating individuals 
from the constraints that uncertainty imposes 
on their freedom reinforce the impression that 
uncertainty adversely affects the autonomous 
character of acts and choices. 
Given the potentially devastating psycho-
logical, familial, social and economic impacts 
of adverse genetic test results though, respecting 
individual autonomy has been considered, both in 
Europe and in the United States, as implying the 
individual’s right to know or not to know.
By autonomy, I mean the rights and liberties 
necessary to individuals in order for them to live 
a life characterized as (in part at least) self-de-
termined, self-authored or self-created, following 
plans and ideals - a conception of the good - that 
they have chosen for themselves.4
In the context of human genetics, respect for 
personal autonomy amounts, for example, to the 
recognition of a right of an individual to know or 
not to know about their genetic disorder. But this is 
contested, given that allowing a right not to know 
would allow people to stand uninformed, whereas 
autonomy is sometimes presented as requiring all 
the available information which may be pertinent 
in order to choose one’s way of living. Rosamond 
Rhodes, for example, held that:
if autonomy is the ground for my right to determine 
my own course, it cannot also be the ground for 
not determining my own course. If autonomy justi-
fies my right to knowledge, it cannot also justify 
my refusing to be informed. (…) From a Kantian 
perspective, autonomy is the essence of what mo-
rality requires of me. The core content of my duty 
is self-determination. To say this in another way, I 
need to appreciate that my ethical obligation is to 
rule myself, that is, to be a just ruler over my own 
actions. As sovereign over myself I am obligated 
to make thoughtful and informed decisions without 
being swayed by irrational emotions, including 
my fear of knowing significant genetic facts about 
myself. (Rhodes, 1998b)
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The relationship between information and 
autonomy is not as straightforward as it is usually 
conceived however, especially when the informa-
tion involved increases the range of predictable 
events, as is the case for genetic information. A 
belief in the positive relationship existing between 
information and freedom has been criticized, both 
generally and in the genetic context. Isaiah Berlin, 
notably, draws attention to the fact that: 
Knowledge, especially risk-knowledge, if it al-
lows the individual to take some preventive ac-
tions or decisions for himself or for others, also 
potentially impacts negatively on other ranges 
of opportunities and experiences by which the 
unknowing individual would have been tempted. 
What knowledge gives with one hand, it may well 
take back with the other. The growth of knowledge 
increases the range of predictable events, and pre-
dictability - inductive or intuitive - despite all that 
has been said against this position, does not seem 
compatible with liberty of choice. (…) if, in other 
words, I claim to have the kind of knowledge about 
myself that I might have about others, then even 
though my sources may be better or my certainty 
greater, such self-knowledge, it seems to me, may 
or may not add to the sum total of my freedom. The 
question is empirical: and the answer depends on 
specific circumstances. From the fact that every 
gain in knowledge liberates me in some respect, 
it does not follow (…), that it will necessarily add 
to the total sum of freedom that I enjoy: it may, 
by taking with one hand more than it gives with 
the other, decrease it. (Berlin, 2000) 
Whether in fact genetic information enhances 
autonomy and freedom is always provisional. The 
fact that, in many cases, predictive genetic infor-
mation is not really specific nor sensitive enough 
(the identification of a predisposing gene in one 
individual doesn’t mean that he will necessarily 
develop the disease; conversely, the absence of 
any known predisposing gene in an individual’s 
make-up doesn’t guarantee that he will never 
develop the illness and is considered ‘medically 
useless and potentially psychologically harming’ 
given that no preventive or curative strategies 
currently exist for the disease at issue), has made 
some scholars and professional groups advocate 
that tests for unpreventable diseases such as 
Alzheimer’s disease should not be provided to 
patients, even at their request.5 What is seldom 
taken into account, moreover, in discussions 
about the right/duty to know and the right not 
to know is the probable pleiotropic character of 
the genetic mutations detected through genetic 
testing. Whereas it may be perfectly sensible to 
wish to gain information about one’s increased 
risk of developing a preventable disease, when 
the same mutation also indicates that one is at 
the pre-symptomatic stage of an incurable and 
unpreventable disease or that one is at increased 
risk of developing such a disease, the test is both 
clinically useful and potentially devastating. The 
APOEe4 genotyping testing is one of those pleio-
tropic tests: it provides information about the risk 
of both atherosclerosis (coronary artery disease) 
- a condition for which preventive measures such 
as cessation of smoking, low-fat diet, exercise, 
and avoidance of stress may decrease the risk - 
and an increased risk of developing Alzheimer’s 
disease. Risk information about heart disease is 
medically useful as it allows early prevention. 
On the contrary, information about the risk of 
developing Alzheimer’s disease does not allow 
the patient to do anything about it, and a positive 
result may produce net adverse consequences.6 
However the strong current presumption 
existing in favor of genetic transparency, both 
to oneself and towards others, contributes to 
concealing the fundamental and subtle ambi-
guities existing between information and truth 
(particularly the probabilistic truth of genetic 
risks identified through genetic tests) on the one 
hand, and between information and freedom or 
autonomy on the other.
In fact rather than determinism, what is sug-
gested by the availability of genetic services is 
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an extension of human agency and choice and 
a parallel decrease in the scope of luck and ne-
cessity. The use of new genetic diagnostic and 
prognostic tools does not initiate any so-called 
genetic revolution, they only intensify an existing 
tendency to shift the responsibility for ill-health 
away from environmental, social and economic 
factors to the individual. Despite the claim – which 
may be partially true - that genetic counselling is 
fundamentally non-directive and that decisions 
about genetic risks are always left to individual 
choices,7 those choices become the precise me-
dium through which a new form of governance is 
exercised, taking citizens’ bodies as both vectors 
and targets of normalization.
[T]he transformed non-directive ethos is based 
on the transmission of expert knowledge to create 
autonomous actors who, through the medium of 
choice consent voluntarily to act responsibly.(…) 
In this practice a prominent social rationality 
emerges: to acquire knowledge about genetic risks 
and embark on preventive action comes to stand 
out as the right way of relating to oneself (taking 
personal responsibility for health), the family 
(saving lives of relatives) and society (maintain-
ing a healthy population).8
The opposition often assumed to exist between 
choice and directiveness lacks operability when, 
instead of opposing directiveness in the name 
of respect for expressed individual choices, one 
acknowledges that individual choices, far from 
being given, natural and objective facts, result, as 
Foucault suggested, from the disciplines, that is, 
from the power immanent in the social field which 
makes up the individual. One may regret that an 
insistence on the positive impact of information 
on an individual’s capacity to make decisions in 
line with his basic wishes be not accompanied 
by a critical assessment of the conditions under 
which those basic wishes are formed. 
Let us note here that the qualification of an 
individual’s entitlements towards “his” genetic 
information as either “rights” or “liberties”, though 
somewhat neglected in current scholarship, is of 
immense practical importance: if taken seriously, 
the theory of fundamental legal relations means, 
for example, that a “right” to know could poten-
tially imply a correlative “duty” for the state to 
make genetic testing part of the health benefits 
packages for those willing to know about their 
genetic make-up, whereas a “liberty” (or privilege) 
to know merely implies that no restriction can be 
imposed to an individual willing to get tested for 
genotypic traits but not that he must be offered 
the test for free if he cannot pay for it.9 In this line 
of reasoning, the growing ideas that individuals 
do have, if not a legal, at least a moral “duty to 
know” about their genetic predispositions, sus-
ceptibilities and risks, and to participate in genetic 
research10 may appear incongruent in a situation 
where existing genetic tests are for the most part 
to be paid by the individuals themselves.
Another comment I would like to make here, is 
that the assessment of public policies about genetic 
rights and liberties needs to be made taking into 
account the somewhat contingent context of the 
current dominant mode of socio-economic and 
cultural interactions. More precisely, that those 
issues of individual rights towards genomic in-
formation appear so crucial today is inescapably 
related to the specific drives of neoliberal societies: 
“informational capitalism” and the “moralization 
of risks”. 
Informational capitalism has been described 
by various critical scholars. Perri 6 (6, 1998, p. 
14-15 ) held that:
what is distinctive about informational capital-
ism is that personal information has become the 
basic fuel on which modern business and govern-
ment run and (…) the systematic accumulation, 
warehousing, processing, analysis, targeting, 
matching, manipulation and use of personal in-
formation is producing new forms of government 
and business (…).
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According to Julie Cohen (2001):
The use of personal information to sort and clas-
sify individuals is inextricably bound up with the 
fabric of our political economy (…). The confla-
tion of information with certainty and projections 
with predictions is not confined to markets. The 
destruction of privacy is the necessary by-product 
of a particular set of beliefs about the predictive 
power of information that operate in both mar-
ket and government spheres. Within this belief 
structure, nothing is random. Success in markets, 
politics, and policy-making can be predicted, and 
failure avoided, using the proper algorithms and 
the right inputs.
In Cohen’s view, the use of even partial or 
incomplete personal information or isolated facts 
about individuals to predict risks and minimize 
uncertainties is described as ‘the hallmark of the 
liberal state and its constituent economic and 
political markets.’
As for the “moralization” of risks, whereas 
the ‘insurance society’ had switched the focus 
from the subjective, moral notions of individual 
fault and responsibility to the objective notions 
of risk and solidarity, neo-liberal governance 
supposes a return from the ‘insurance society’ 
to the ‘actuarial, post-Keynesian’ society where 
‘(...) acceptance of solidarity is (...) accompanied 
by a demand for control over personal behavior’ 
(Rosanvallon, 1995). With the gradual substitu-
tion of selectivity to universality as a principle for 
the distribution of welfare benefits, discourses of 
personal empowerment, activation and respon-
sibility induce individuals to assume personal 
responsibility for most adverse circumstances 
resulting from bad (brute) luck for which they 
would have expected some compensation from the 
collectivity in a traditional welfare-state (Handler, 
2000; Handler, 2001). “Genetic risk” functions 
as a technology of the self, urging individuals 
to get the most information they can about their 
own genetic risk status, to act ‘rationally and 
responsively’ to promote their and their relatives’ 
health upon receiving information, and to take 
personal responsibility – rather than transferring 
their risk in a collective pool and awaiting relief 
from social solidarity – for the adverse outcomes 
would they have failed to take advantage of the 
available predictive genetic information. To that 
extent, genetic testing may well become a privi-
leged disciplinary tool of neoliberal governance, 
but does not necessarily increase the liberty and 
autonomy of individuals. 
CONFIDENTIALITY, INTRA-FAMILIAL 
DISCLOSURE, AND FAMILIAL
MANAGEMENT OF GENETIC
INFORMATION: SELECTED ISSUES 
Although the horizon of neo-liberal governance 
is the “responsibilisation and empowerment of 
individuals”, or their emancipation from the 
old welfare institutions, at the fundamental 
level of philosophical anthropology, the genetic 
‘representational regime’ induces fundamental 
perturbations in the liberal representations of the 
modernist sovereign subject on which, however, 
neo-liberal governance precisely relies. The 
liberal individual legal subject understood as a 
stable, unitary, embodied entity acknowledged 
as the fundamental unit of liberal societies does 
not match the ‘subject’ of genetic information, 
which transcends the boundaries of the individual 
both “over time”, as has just been suggested, and 
“spatially”, as intrafamilial conflicts of interests 
with regards to genetic information makes the very 
identity of the ‘legal subject’ and its equivalence 
with the unitary, embodied individual unsure in 
the genetic context. 
The ‘subject’ of genetic information has even 
been identified as a transgenerational, collective, 
‘non-material genomic body’ (Scully, 2005), an 
‘information structure’ (Harraway, 1997),11 that 
overflows the traditional limits of material em-
bodiment characterizing the unitary vision of the 
subject as fundamental unit of liberal societies. 
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Both in space and in time - the ‘subject’, contem-
plated from a genetic point-of-view overflows the 
boundaries of the individual legal subject.12 Tak-
ing inspiration from feminist scholarship it might 
be useful to consider whether and to what extent 
the ‘self’ deserving legal protection exceeds the 
spatially identifiable, physically bounded subject 
(Karpin, 2005). Disembodied biological and 
informational samples collected in biobanks ‘cre-
ate’ informational identities (Franko Aas, 2006) 
‘parallel’ to the body and independent from the 
narratives through which individuals construct 
and keep their biographical identity. The new 
identities, as information structures, allow new 
types of surveillance practices which, because 
they do not immediately target embodied identi-
ties, but merely the virtual identities composed 
in the dry language of electronic records, are 
not readily open to negotiation or contestation. 
Those issues will not be addressed in the present 
chapter, even though the questions raised by the 
superposition of virtual identity to the embodied 
identity gain ascendancy in science and technol-
ogy studies given current developments in the 
field of information technologies with research 
projects in ambient intelligence and ubiquitous 
computing. It is enough for our present purpose 
to suggest that both the “genetic revolution” and 
the “information revolution” (involving profiling 
techniques, rfid tags, video surveillance, ambient 
intelligence etc.), despite their apparent heteroge-
neity, may in fact raise intersecting challenges.
Besides this superposition of a disembodied 
informational identity to the embodied self, the 
subject of genetic information and of genetic 
privacy, the patient entitled to genetic confiden-
tiality is not even easily identifiable in the genetic 
context. Enabling the prediction of disease or the 
assessment of disease-risk with varying degrees 
of certainty,13 genetic information is of course 
important to the tested person,14 but may also be 
crucial to persons who share the same genetic 
inheritance and are virtually exposed to the same 
genetic risks, namely his or her blood-relatives. 
The nature of the duties owed by one person vis 
a vis his relatives when aware of the presence of 
specific familial genetic susceptibility, predisposi-
tion or genetic ailment that may increase disease 
risk, or when asked to participate in a familial 
inquiry in order allow detection of genetic risks 
on the request of other persons the family, are 
highly controversial.15 (Knoppers, 1998; Knop-
pers, 1998a; De Sola, 1994; Abbing, 1995; Apel, 
2001; Rhodes, 1998; Takala and Häyry, 2000).
Those persons (family members), “third par-
ties” with regard to the doctor-patient relationship, 
may sometimes be recognized a legitimate and 
legally protected interest, however not usually 
raised up to the status of a right to force intra-fa-
milial disclosure, but requiring some procedural 
measures enhancing the patient’s aptitudes to 
reflect upon the interests of those third parties and 
to exhibit some sense of responsibility towards 
them. The limited scope of the present chapter 
will not allow a full discussion of the full range 
of questions ensuing from possible conflicts of 
interests between the individual “tested” and 
interested “third parties” in the context of human 
genetics. Our ambition is merely to outline five 
major issues that challenge the traditional cen-
trality of the individual legal subject in bioethics 
and biolaw.
Does a Child’s Right to Know His/
Her ‘Genetic Identity’ Trump His/Her 
Parent(s) Right to Genetic
Confidentiality? 
The questions raised by the new human genetics in 
this regard are not absolutely novel. The question 
that the European Court of Human Rights had 
to confront in Odièvre v. France,16 for instance, 
involved a woman’s claim to access confidential 
information concerning her birth (where her bio-
logical mother had decided to use the possibility 
of “anonymous delivery” offered by French law) 
and to obtain copies of any documents, public 
records or full birth certificates whereas her 
biological mother had requested that the birth 
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be kept secret and had waived her rights with 
regard to the child. The French law governing 
confidentiality at birth prevented the daughter 
(claimant) from obtaining information about her 
natural family. The Court held that the French Law 
did not constitute, in that case, a disproportionate 
interference with the claimant’s right to privacy, 
but nevertheless acknowledged that the right to 
privacy (Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights) protects, among other interests, 
the right to personal development, and that matters 
relevant to personal development included details 
of a person’s identity as a human being and the 
vital interest in obtaining information necessary 
to discover the truth concerning important aspects 
of one’s personal identity. 
In the United Kingdom, the Administrative 
Court faced a comparable case in Rose v Secre-
tary of State for Health and the HFEA17 involving 
the claim brought by two persons, one who had 
been conceived by artificial insemination in 1972 
(before the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act of 1990) and one born also from an artificial 
insemination procedure in 1996, both requesting 
disclosure of information about the respective 
donors. The Administrative Court held that Ar-
ticle 8 of the Human Rights Act of 1998 encom-
passed the right to respect of «genetic identity» 
entitling children born from in vitro fertilization 
procedures to receive information about their 
biological fathers. 
It is far from certain however that a person’s 
rights with regards to her «genetic identity» im-
plies that she has a right to know about genetic 
test results relating to her blood relatives, nor that 
her right to know trumps the tested person’s right 
to confidentiality and privacy. 
Is There a ‘Duty of Genetic
Beneficence’ Towards Family
Members? 
Genetic information, given its collective, inher-
ited character, may challenge the classical duties 
of health practitioners: with regard to whom 
are they obliged to respect their obligations of 
confidentiality and beneficence? Moreover, one 
may wonder if the patient’s right to know may 
imply that his family members are obliged to col-
laborate in the testing procedure by themselves 
undergoing diverse tests or by answering the 
many questions which arise in the context of the 
familial inquiry.
There are indeed other factors, specific to ge-
netic information, which contribute to its shared 
character. For example, genetic knowledge about 
individuals may have to be supplemented by 
information obtained from relatives in order for 
such knowledge to be meaningful. This problem 
may be a partially temporary one, due to the fact 
that there is at present no direct test for the gene 
itself in many genetic conditions, and a marker or 
linkage test remains necessary. Linkage tests are 
now less frequently used, however even where a 
direct gene test is available, it remains important 
to confirm the mutation in at least one other af-
fected family member. This is especially important 
where, as is the case of most genetic disorders, 
there is more than one form of genetic mutation 
that causes the disorder (Bell, 2001).Complex 
dilemmas relating to the familial disclosure of 
genetic information are worsened by practical 
difficulties. The dispersion and atomisation of 
families, which is one of the major specificities of 
our times, renders it impossible sometimes to carry 
out research on relevant blood-related persons, 
from which one would need to obtain information 
or to whom one would like to communicate certain 
information concerning their genetic risks. There 
is indeed something paradoxical in the attempts 
to reconstruct genetic families when, precisely, 
one increasingly witnesses the decomposition 
and recomposition of biological families several 
times by generation (Knoppers, 1998b). 
How should the twofold opposition between 
the right to confidentiality and privacy of some 
and the right to the protection of health of others, 
and between the right to know of some and the 
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right of others to remain ignorant of their genetic 
make-up be resolved?
Is There a Professional ‘Duty to Warn’ 
Family Members of Genetic Risks?
The availability of genetic testing challenges one 
of the most classical ethical rules governing the 
patient-doctor relationship: the rule of confidenti-
ality. Because genetic disease is transmitted only 
by way of procreation, information about genetic 
disease is unique in that there is a propensity 
(highly variable) for the condition to be shared by 
members of a family who are biologically related. 
The issue of how individual patients and their doc-
tors should act in relation to the knowledge that 
the patient has a genetic condition - specifically, 
whether the patient and/or the doctor should or 
must inform relevant members of the patient’s 
family - is a looming area of medico-legal con-
troversy. There is a tension between the existing 
legal and professional obligation of the health care 
professional to keep confidential any medical or 
otherwise personal information discovered in the 
context of a medical examination or consultation 
and his competing obligation to prevent harm to 
others. In the genetic context, the confidentiality 
duties of the physician and the privacy rights of 
the patient may conflict with a perceived duty 
to prevent harm to others. In the landmark case 
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Califor-
nia,18 the Supreme Court of California ruled that 
mental health professionals have a duty to provide 
adequate warning if a patient threatens the life 
of a third party during counseling sessions. The 
facts of the case were as follows. Prosenjit Pod-
dar killed Tatiana Tarasoff. Two months earlier, 
he had confessed his intention to kill her to Dr 
Lawrence, a psychologist employed by the Cowell 
Memorial Hospital at the University of California 
at Berkeley. Tatiana’s parents sued the Regents 
of the University of California on two grounds: 
the defendants’ failure to warn the victim of the 
impending danger and their failure to bring about 
Poddar’s confinement. The defendants argued in 
return that they owed no duty of reasonable care 
to Tatiana, who was not in any doctor-patient 
relationship with them. But the opinion of the 
Court was that:
the public policy favouring protection of the 
confidential character of patient-psychotherapist 
communications must yield to the extent to which 
disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. 
The protective privilege ends where the public peril 
begins. Our current crowded and computerized so-
ciety compels the interdependence of its members. 
In this risk-infested society we can hardly tolerate 
the further exposure to danger that would result 
from a concealed knowledge of the therapist that 
his patient was lethal. If the exercise of reasonable 
care to protect the threatened victim requires the 
therapist to warn the endangered party or those 
who can reasonably be expected to notify him, 
we see no sufficient societal interest that would 
protect and justify concealment. The containment 
of such risks lies in the public interest. 
In the Case of Genetic Testing, Should 
the Relevant Health Professional
Inform a Patient’s Relatives that They 
Could be Genetically at Risk Even in 
Cases where the Patient Does not
Consent to Such Disclosure?
In another case - Pate v.Threlkel,19 the Florida 
Supreme Court was asked by the plaintiff to 
recognise a genetic family as a legal unit. In 
that case, commenced in the early 1990’s, Heidy 
Pate claimed that Dr. J. Threlkel, the physician 
of Pate’s mother, Marianne New, was under the 
obligation to warn her mother that she suffered 
from a hereditary disease that placed her children 
(including the plaintiff) at risk of developing the 
same condition. At the time of the suit, the plain-
tiff had fallen ill and claimed that, had she been 
warned of her hereditary risk, her own condition 
would have been discovered earlier and might 
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have been curable. The court recognized a duty 
owed by the doctor to warn his patient’s child as 
well as the patient herself, but also stated that 
‘To require the physician to seek out and warn 
members of the patient’s family would often be 
difficult or impractical and would place too heavy 
a burden upon the physician. Thus we emphasise 
that in any circumstances in which the physician 
has a duty to warn of a genetically transferable 
disease, that duty will be satisfied by warning 
the patient.’
However, in Safer v. Pack,20 the New-Jersey 
court went further and imposed a duty to directly 
warn the family members at risk. The facts were 
quite similar to the facts of Pate v. Threlkel: in 
1990, Donna Safer was diagnosed with a heredi-
tary form of colon cancer from which her father 
R. Batkin had died twenty-six years earlier. In 
1992, Donna Safer brought a suit against Dr. G. 
Pack, her father’s former physician, asserting that 
he had provided her with negligent medical care, 
although Dr. Pack had never treated Donna or 
acted as her physician in any way. Donna Safer 
argued that the physician was obliged to warn 
those at risk that his patient’s condition was 
hereditary, so that they might have the benefits 
of early examination, monitoring, detection and 
treatment, and thus the opportunity to avoid the 
most baneful consequences of the condition. The 
Safer court, unlike the Florida Supreme Court in 
Threlkel, rejected a limited interpretation of the 
doctor’s duty to warn (a duty to warn his patient, 
but not to directly warn members of that patient’s 
family), and defined a broad duty to warn not 
only the patient, but also to directly warn those 
members of the patient’s family at risk of falling ill 
with the hereditary disease at issue. Judge Kestin 
explained: ‘Although an overly broad and general 
application of the physician’s duty to warn might 
lead to confusion, conflict or unfairness in many 
types of circumstances, we are confident that the 
duty to warn of avertable risk from genetic causes, 
by definition a matter of familial concern, is suf-
ficiently narrow to serve the interests of justice. 
Further, it is appropriate… that the duty be seen 
as owed not only to the patient himself but that 
it also extend beyond the interests of a patient to 
members of the immediate family of the patient 
who may be adversely affected by a breach of 
that duty’. Interestingly enough, the court had 
considered that there was no essential difference 
between ‘the type of genetic threat at issue here 
and the menace of infection, contagion or threat 
of physical harm… The individual at risk is easily 
identified, and the substantial future harm may 
be averted or minimised by a timely and effec-
tive warning.’
The more far-reaching implications of that 
case are controversial. They were even rejected 
by the New Jersey legislature in 1996,21 when a 
statute was passed for the purpose of protecting 
genetic privacy, which allows health care providers 
to warn relatives of those suffering from genetic 
disorders only if the patient has consented to such 
disclosure or after the patient has died.
In the Schroeder v. Perkel case, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court22 had observed that the duties of 
physicians may extend beyond the interests of his 
patient, to members of that patient’s immediate 
family who might be adversely affected by the 
physician’s breach of duty. In that case, the court 
reasoned that the doctor’s duty followed from the 
potential harm that might occur to the patient’s 
parents in case they were conceive a second child, 
unaware that the second child might also suffer 
from cystic fibrosis.
In Molloy v. Meyer,23 the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota held that ‘A physician’s duty regarding 
genetic testing and diagnosis extends beyond the 
patient to biological parents who foreseeably may 
be harmed by a breach of that duty.’ The plaintiffs, 
Kimberly Molloy and her husband Robert Flomer, 
had a daughter with developmental retardation. 
Four years after their daughter’s birth, K. Molloy 
consulted Dr. Diane Meier to determine whether 
her daughter’s developmental retardation had a 
genetic cause. Dr. Meier ordered chromosomal 
testing of the child, including a test for fragile X 
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syndrome, a hereditary condition that causes a 
range of mental impairments. But the fragile X 
test was never performed, and the tests that were 
done revealed no genetic abnormality. After hav-
ing been told by Dr. Reno Backus, another physi-
cian to whom K. Molloy referred her daughter, 
that the child was developmentally delayed with 
autistic tendencies of unknown origins, she asked 
about the risk of having another disabled child, 
as she intended to have a second child with her 
second husband, Glenn Molloy. Dr Backus told 
her that the chances of having a second child with 
the same impairments were extremely remote. 
Unfortunately, her second child also appeared to 
have the syndrome. Two years after the birth of 
her second child, K. Molloy took a genetic test 
that identified her as a carrier for fragile X. Her 
two children were also identified as having the 
fragile X syndrome. The Molloys sued Dr. Meier, 
Dr. Backus and another physician for their negli-
gence in the care they owed to the first child and 
to themselves. They reproached the physicians 
that they negligently told them that the first child 
did not have the fragile X syndrome when in fact 
the child had never been tested for it.
In a case decided in Italy by the Garante per 
la protezione dei dati personali, the Garante 
allowed a woman to access her father’s genetic 
data despite the latter’s refusal of consent. The 
woman’s request was motivated by her wish to 
take a fully informed reproductive decision by 
assessing the risk of transmitting a genetic disease 
that affected her father. The justification provided 
for the decision consisted in the evaluation by the 
Garante that the woman’s ‘right to health’ (health 
being defined by the Guarante as including ‘psy-
chological and physical well-being’) trumped her 
father’s right to privacy.24
Other cases are imaginable where a patient’s 
right to privacy and confidentiality would conflict 
with the interests of members of his/her family 
with regard to information about their own risk 
status. One may imagine, for example, the fol-
lowing situation: a woman aware of her strong 
familial history of breast cancer decides to take 
a BRCA1 gene test. Although her mother never 
went for the test, her grandmother had tested 
positive for the BRCA 1 mutation. If the woman 
also tests positive for the mutation, it necessar-
ily means her mother is also positive. Should the 
latter be warned of her increased risk? What if 
the tested woman does not want to disclose that 
information to her mother?
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the case 
may arise where a family member who does not 
want to know that he/she is at risk may be forced 
to know: a positive test for Huntington disease 
performed on an unborn child indicates that the 
parent with a familial history of Huntington 
disease will for sure develop the disease. Given 
the Predictive and prenatal testing are available 
for Huntington disease, but not all people at risk 
choose to have the test.25 
Conflicts of interests may also arise when, for 
example, having conceived a child, a man with 
a family history of Huntington disease and thus 
at a 50 per cent risk of developing Huntington’s 
disease himself later in life does not wish to be 
tested and prefers not to know whether he will 
actually develop the illness. If the woman asks 
for prenatal genetic diagnosis, a positive test will 
indicate, with certainty, that the father will have 
Huntington’s disease. Should the right not to know 
of the prospective father trump the paramount 
interest of the mother to know whether the un-
born child is affected or not? The current global 
legal attitude regarding decisions to undertake 
prenatal genetic diagnosis is to respect the will 
of the mother who is physically concerned by the 
test. She is the patient to whom medical doctors 
and genetic counsellors have a duty of care (Tas-
sicker, 2003). 
Yet, the American Society of Human Genetics 
has already suggested that genetic information 
may be viewed as a ‘family possession rather 
than simply a personal one’. In a note explaining 
the suggestion, one even reads the suggestion 
of a family-health model that contemplates the 
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physician’s patient as the entire family, where 
family is understood to refer to a genetic network 
rather than a social institution (American Society 
of Human Genetics, 1998). 
The Royal College of Physicians of the United 
Kingdom similarly suggested in 1991 that:
because of the nature of genes, it may be argued 
that genetic information about any individual 
should not be regarded as personal to that indi-
vidual, but as the common property of other people 
who may share those genes, and who need the 
information in order to find out their own genetic 
constitution. If so, an individual’s prima facie right 
to confidentiality and privacy might be regarded 
as overridden by the rights of others to have ac-
cess to information about them. (Royal College 
of Physicians Committees on Clinical Genetics 
and Ethical Issues in Medicine, 1991)
Even more radically, some scholars dismiss 
concerns about patient confidentiality by as-
suming the pre-eminence of the genetic family 
within which individual identity is subsumed by 
the identity of the whole. For example, R. Burnett 
writes that:
[T]here is no need to consider confidentiality in the 
genetic context because, arguably, confidentiality 
is not sacrificed. Confidentiality is not in danger 
because, even assuming that policies in favour of 
confidentiality outweigh a duty to warn, a duty 
of confidentiality is not violated in the situation 
involving the warning of genetic diseases. (…) 
Now, with the introduction of genetic mapping, 
(…) the patient/physician relationship has been 
reconfigured to reflect the individual’s ties to 
his or her ancestors and descendants. (Burnett, 
1999: 559)
According to this comment, the right to pri-
vacy is just not applicable to genetic information 
in genetic family contexts. At the heart of the 
ideological construction of the genetic family is 
the obliteration of privacy.
This appears odd especially to the extent that 
it would suggest that a person’s right to genetic 
confidentiality could not be opposed to any blood-
related person, be that person part of his or her 
“social family” or not. The European working 
party set up under Article 29 of the Directive 95/46/
EC on data protection (the so-called Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party), acknowledged, 
in its Working Document on Genetic Data of 17 
March 2004,26 that:
a new, legally relevant social group can be said to 
have come into existence - namely, the biological 
group, the group of kindred as opposed, technically 
speaking, to one’s family. Indeed, such a group 
does not include family members such as one’s 
spouse or foster children, whereas it also consists 
of entities outside the family circle - whether in law 
or factually - such as gamete donors or the woman 
who, at the time of child birth, did not recognise 
her child and requested that her particulars should 
not be disclosed - this right being supported in 
certain legal systems. The anonymity granted to 
the latter entities raises a further issue, which is 
usually dealt with by providing that the personal 
data required for genetic testing be communicated 
exclusively to a physician without referring to the 
identity of the relevant individual.
One may fear that subsuming the individual’s 
right to genetic confidentiality to the interests of 
the other members of the same “genetic group” 
would adversely impact on the trust and confi-
dence that should prevail in any doctor-patient 
relationship, with consequences detrimental to 
both the individual’s and public health.
Individual v. Familial Consent in
Biobanking
 
According to regulations in force in most coun-
tries, notably in Europe and the United States, the 
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establishment of a biobank or a genetic database 
would require the previous consent of each indi-
vidual involved. In Iceland however, individual 
consent has been presumed, each person being 
automatically included in the database unless she 
formally expresses her refusal. In Ragnhildur 
Guömundsdóttir v. The State of Iceland,27 the 
Icelandic Supreme Court ruled that the Health 
Sector Database Act of 1998 does not comply with 
Iceland’s constitutional privacy protections. The 
case involved the question whether a woman could 
refuse that health information about her deceased 
father be included in the Health Sector Database. 
The court ruled that Ms. Guömundsdóttir could 
not opt out of the database on behalf of her father, 
but that she could prevent the transfer of her father’s 
medical records (especially those concerning her 
father’s hereditary characteristics) because of the 
possibility to infer information about her from 
such records. Moreover, the Court found that 
removing or encrypting personal identifiers such 
as name and address is not sufficient to prevent 
the identification of individuals involved in the 
database, since they may still be identified by a 
combination of factors such as age, municipality, 
marital status, education and profession, and the 
specification of a particular profession. The mere 
encryption of direct personal identifiers, and the 
various forms of monitoring entrusted to public 
agencies or committees, the court ruled, are not 
enough to comply with the Icelandic constitution’s 
protection of privacy. This, according to the Court, 
required a change in the Health Database Act of 
1998 (Gertz, 2004a). 
Although the above mentioned case appears 
quite isolate so far, the mushrooming of population 
biobanks makes it most probable that intra-familial 
disagreements relating to the inclusion of genetic 
material in biobanks will become problematic in 
the future. For the purpose that concerns us here, 
the case is interesting to the extent that it shows 
how human genetics disrupts the traditional views 
about the individual right to consent and withdraw 
consent to research participation and the extent to 
which the law is forced to acknowledge the fact 
that the ‘subject’ of genetic information exceeds 
the individual liberal unit of the traditional legal 
subject. 
CONCLUSION
The aim of the present chapter was to elucidate the 
paradoxical position of the individual legal subject 
in the context of human genetics. In particular, it 
has observed the discrepancy existing between 
the neoliberal idea of the subject as a unified, 
embodied, bounded, autonomous self enclosed 
in the present, and the somewhat ‘disciplined’ 
and at the same time ‘collectivized’ subject that 
results from the complexification of that notion 
in the “post-genomic genetic era”. 
The first complexification that has been sug-
gested results from the “risk anticipation” that 
predictive genetic testing imposes to the subject. 
Because genetic testing allows the identification of 
patients in an anticipatory sense, a dimension of 
otherness that genetic information introduces in 
the “self” takes the form of an inescapably antici-
pated ‘future self’ which the genetically informed 
individual can no longer ignore. Focusing on the 
debates occurring regarding the individual’s right 
to know and right not to know, the first section has 
been the occasion to criticize presupposition that 
information about one’s genetic risks increases 
one’s liberty and/or autonomy. 
Another disruption that genetics imposes 
on the notion of the unified self as fundamental 
liberal unit results from the “collective nature” 
of genetic information as the “patient/genetic 
data subject”, in the post-genomic era, tends to 
become a “collective entity”. Issues of confi-
dentiality, intra-familial disclosure and familial 
management of genetic information, discussed 
in the second section, illustrate the disruptions 
undergone by the notion of the traditional legal 
subject in this regard. 
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Some authors, like Dolgin (2000), worry that 
the emerging notion of the genetic group, and the 
shift in the locus of privacy and identity from the 
autonomous individual to the genetic group threat-
ens long-standing Western values that depend 
upon the ideological centrality of autonomous 
individuality.28 Dolgin also warns that:
The genetic family insists only on one thing - the 
recognition of biological information. In that, it 
upsets a society and a legal order committed to 
the position that autonomous choice can sustain 
a moral frame within which family life is distin-
guished from life in other social domains (…) 
At the edges of a broad commitment to freedom, 
and thus choice, the law faces the medicalized 
family, and begins to elaborate its variant: the 
genetic family. At least in the first instance, this 
family serves neither individualism nor choice. It 
reflects the amorality of DNA through which it is 
delimited, and to which it can be reduced. Unlike 
the notion of biogenic substance as traditionally 
defined, DNA is indifferent to the content of family 
life. This construct of family differs from others 
in abandoning even the repentance that contem-
porary families should be modeled on nostalgic 
images of traditional families within which, it is 
presumed, enduring love and absolute loyalty 
were assured. (Dolgin, 2000)
Others (Karpin, 2005; Sommerville and Eng-
lish, 1999) insist that genetic challenges to the in-
dividualist conceptions of the subject provides the 
beneficial opportunity to deconstruct the liberal 
myth of the self-sufficient, autonomous individual 
and to acknowledge the inherent interdependency 
of human beings. Anyway, debates about genetic 
confidentiality, genetic privacy, and intra-familial 
management of genetic information provide a 
fresh opportunity to reassess our political and 
cultural conceptions of what it means to be a 
“subject” in the circumstances of our times.
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KEY TERMS
Confidentiality: A duty held by professionals 
towards their clients and patients whereby they 
are committed to keep secret anything they learn 
in the course of the context of their professional 
relation with their client or patient.
Genetic Risk: Revealed and quantified by 
assessment of family history and/or by genetic 
testing, a genetic risk may, in exceptional cases, 
indicate with certainty that the individual will 
develop a specific disease but at unknown time, or, 
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most of the time, merely indicate that the individual 
may be particularly predisposed or susceptible to 
develop a specific disease if exposed to specific 
chemicals, aliments, or lifestyle. 
Informational Capitalism: A contemporary 
political, economic and cultural tendency to per-
ceive personal information as a basic resource (just 
as energy), an essential input to the management of 
public and private enterprises, as the most reliable 
element on which to build safety enhancement 
and efficiency strategies, and as a commodity, 
exchangeable on the “information market”.
Legal Subject: Classically, the legal subject 
as central unit of liberalism, is perceived as a 
unified, fix embodied entity. Post-modern and 
post-conventional scholars have challenged 
that unitary vision of the subject. The “genetic 
paradigm” further questions the adequacy of the 
liberal vision of the subject for the law. 
Privacy: As fundamental human rights, 
encompasses both the right for the individual to 
control some aspects of his personality he proj-
ects on the world, and a right to freely develop 
his personality without excessive interference by 
the State or by others in matters that are of his 
exclusive concern. 
Right Not to Know: Used in the context of 
genetic testing, an individual’s right not to know 
refers to the right an individual who has undergone 
a genetic test to refuse information about the full 
or partial test results. 
Right to Know: Used in the context of genetic 
testing, an individual’s right to know refers to the 
right an individual who has undergone a genetic 
test to know the full test results if he so wishes. 
The right to know does not necessarily implies the 
right for a person to benefit from genetic testing 
for free nor his right to learn about the result of a 
genetic test performed on a member of his family, 
be that person genetically related.
ENDNOTES
1 The judicial relationship between that person 
and the genetic information produced by 
the tests are usually qualified as individual 
rights. 
2 The important financial support provided 
by the European Commission to research 
consortia such as the Public Health Genom-
ics European Network (PHGEN) preparing 
all relevant actors for the future integration 
of genomic insights in general public health 
policy amplifies the general level of expec-
tation that indeed genetic information will 
become central in managing individual and 
public health.
3 Depending on the patterns of inheritance 
of the genetic diseases studied - whether 
the illness is monogenic or not, whether it 
is monofactorial or not -- the degree of cer-
tainty and accurateness of the conclusions 
driven by genetic information regarding 
the future outburst of an illness or as to the 
probability of transmission of that illness 
to the offspring will vary substantially. The 
matter will be developed further later. 
4 See Onora O’Neil (O’Neill, 2002), recalling 
the wide variety of notions that have been as-
sociated to the concept of autonomy by schol-
ars such as Gerald Dworkin’s (Dworkin, 
1988), listing liberty (positive or negative), 
dignity, integrity, individuality, indepen-
dence, responsibility and self-knowledge, 
self-assertion, critical reflection, freedom 
from obligation, absence of external causa-
tion, and knowledge of one’s own interest 
as concepts that have been equated to the 
concept of autonomy, or as Ruth Faiden 
and Thomas Beauchamps (Faden, 1986) 
according to whome autonomy may also 
be defined as privacy, voluntariness, self-
mastery, choosing freely, choosing one’s own 
moral position and accepting responsibility 
for one’s choices. 
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5 A correlation has been detected, for example, 
between APOE4 genotype and a greater 
probability of developing Alzheimer’s dis-
ease, but this is only one of the factors of 
the illness. 
6 See Wachbroit  (1998). For more information 
about ApoE genotyping, see http://www.
labtestsonline.org/understanding/analytes/
apoe/test.html.
7 The World Medical Association, in its 
Declaration on the Human Genome Project 
explicitly mentioned that ‘One should respect 
the will of persons screened and their right 
to decide about participation and about the 
use of the information obtained.’ (World 
Health Organization, 2005) Similarly, the 
Council for International Organizations of 
Medical Sciences, in its 1991 Declaration 
of Inuyama, held that ‘voluntarism should 
be the guiding principle in the provision of 
genetic services’.
8 See Koch (2005) See also Lupton (1993: 
433): ‘[R]isk discourse as it is currently 
used in public health draws upon the fin de 
millennium mood of the late 20th century, 
which targets the body as a site of toxicity, 
contamination, and catastrophe, subject to 
and needful of a high degree of surveil-
lance and control. No longer is the body a 
temple to be worshipped as the house of : it 
has become a commodified and regulated 
object that must be strictly monitored by its 
owner to prevent lapses in health-threatening 
behaviours as identified by risk discourse’, 
and (Novas, 2000, p 507) : ‘[G]enetic forms 
of thought have become intertwined within 
ethical problematizations of how to conduct 
one’s life, formulate objectives and plan for 
the future in relation to genetic risk. In these 
life strategies, genetic forms of personhood 
make productive alliances and combinations 
with forms of selfhood that construct the 
subject as autonomous, prudent, responsible 
and self-actualising.’
9 For a clear analysis of jural opposites (Right/
No-Right; Privilege/Duty; Power/Dis-
ability; Immunity/Liability) and jural cor-
relatives (Right/Duty; Privilege/No-Right; 
Power/Liability; Immunity/Disability), see 
the foundational work of Wesley N. Hohfeld 
(1923).
10 The principle of « solidarity », as endorsed 
by the HUGO in its recent Statement of 
Pharmacogenomics (PGx): Solidarity, Eq-
uity and Governance (Genomics, Society 
and Policy, 2007, Vol.3, No. 1, pp. 44-47), 
relies on the assumption that « because of 
shared vulerabilities, people have common 
interests and moral responsibilities to each 
other. Willingness to share information and 
to participate in research is a praiseworthy 
contribution to society” yet is complemented 
by a principle of “equity” according to which 
“to reduce health inequalities between dif-
ferent populations, and to work towards 
equal access to care is an important prereq-
uisite for implementing genomic knowledge 
for the benefit of society.” 
11 ‘Most fundamentally,(…) the human genome 
projects produce entities of a different onto-
logical kind than flesh-and-blood organisms 
(…) or any other sort of “normal” organic be-
ing (...) the human genome projects produce 
ontologically specific things called databases 
as objects of knowledge and practice. The 
human to be represented, then, has a par-
ticular kind of totality, or species being, as 
well as a specific kind of individuality. At 
whatever level of individuality or collec-
tivity, from a single gene region extracted 
from one sample through the whole species 
genome, this human is itself an informational 
structure.’ (Harraway: 1997, p. 247)
12 ‘Genetic technologies, even as they seem 
to promise the perfectly delimited and con-
trolled human body, break down and disrupt 
other boundaries. In learning how to control 
body boundaries, geneticists inevitably 
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shift them, producing anxiety, horror, and 
disgust. Modernist definitions of the body, 
based on boundaries of self and other, human 
and animal, organism and machine (and the 
context of nature and culture) are disrupted 
by a blueprint that allows unprecedented 
interactions, swapping over, interference, 
and convergence of the subject. This is 
genetics at its mot threatening, at least to a 
self-conception based on stable boundaries.’ 
(O’Connell, 2005, p. 225)
13 Even though the current practice does not 
allow, in most cases, to determine the time 
of occurrence of late onset illness. 
14 The judicial relationship between that person 
and the genetic information produced by 
the tests are usually qualified as individual 
rights. 
15 Rhodes, R (1998b). Genetic Links, familiy 
ties and social bounds: Rights and respon-
sibilities in the face of genetic knowledge. 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 23(1): 
10-30.
16 Odièvre v. France, 42326/98 (2003) ECHR 
86 (13 February 2003). 
17 Rose v Secretary of State for Health and the 
HFEA [2002] EWHC 1593
18 Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of 
California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d334, 131 
Cal. Reptr. 14 (1976). See Riccardi (1996).
19 Pate v.Threlkel, 661 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1995).
20 Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188 
(1996)
21 Genetic privacy Act, NJ, Stat. Ann & 
17B:30.
22 Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53 at 69-70 
(1981). 
23 Molloy v. Meyer, 679 N.W.2d 711, 719. Mol-
loy v. Meier, 2004 Minn. Lexis 268 (May 
20, 2004). See Offit (2004) 
24 Garante’s Bulletin (Cittadini e Società dell 
Informazione 1999, No.8, 13-15), cited in 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
Working Document on Genetic Data, 17 
March 2004, 12178/03/EN, WP 91 (The 
Working Party was set up under Article 29 
of Directive 95/46/EC as an independent 
European advisory body on data protec-
tion and privacy.): ‘In linea de principio 
deve osservarsi che la conoscenza, prima 
del coceptimento o durante la gravidanza, 
del rischio probabilistico di insorgenza di 
patologie, anche di tipo genetico, sulla per-
sona che si intende concepire o sul nascituro 
puo certamente contrubuire a migliorare 
le condizioni di benessere psico-fisico 
della gestante, nel quadro di une piena tu-
tela della salute come diritto fondamentale 
dell’individuo ex art.32 Cost. L’accesso ai 
dati sanitari del padre della richiedente ap-
pare giustificato dall’esigenza di tutelare 
il benessere psico-fisico della stessa e tale 
interesse puo, nella circostanza in esame, 
comportare un ragionevole sacrificio del 
diritto alla riservatezza dell interessato.’
25 It has even been found that most people at 
risk for Huntington’s disease choose not to 
be tested (Binedell, 1998). 
26 12178/03/EN WP 91.
27 Icelandic Supreme Court, No. 151/2003, 27 
November 2003. 
28 Dolgin is also concerned that ‘The genetic 
family insists only on one thing - the recog-
nition of biological information. In that, it 
upsets a society and a legal order committed 
to the position that autonomous choice can 
sustain a moral frame within which family 
life is distinguished from life in other social 
domains (…) At the edges of a broad com-
mitment to freedom, and thus choice, the law 
faces the medicalized family, and begins to 
elaborate its variant: the genetic family. At 
least in the first instance, this family serves 
neither individualism nor choice. It reflects 
the amorality of DNA through which it is 
delimited, and to which it can be reduced. 
Unlike the notion of biogenic substance as 
traditionally defined, DNA is indifferent 
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to the content of family life. This construct 
of family differs from others in abandon-
ing even the repentance that contemporary 
families should be modelled on nostalgic 
images of traditional families within which, 
it is presumed, enduring love and absolute 
loyalty were assured.’ (Dolgin, 2000). 
